Abstract. Problems of secure communication and computation have been studied extensively in network models. Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial, Franklin and Yung, and Franklin and Wright have initiated the study of secure communication and secure computation in multi-recipient (broadcast) models. A \broadcast channel" (such as Ethernet) enables one processor to send the same message|simultaneously and privately| to a xed subset of processors. Franklin and Wright, and Wang and Desmedt have shown that if there are at most k malicious (Byzantine style) processors, then there is an e cient protocol for achieving probabilisticly reliable and perfectly private communication in a strongly nconnected network where n k + 1. While these results are unconditional, we will consider these problems in the scenario of conditional reliability, and then improve the bounds. In this paper, using the results for hardness of approximation and optimization problems, we will design communication protocols (with broadcast channels) which could defeat as many malicious faults as possible. Speci cally, assuming certain approximation hardness result, we will construct strongly n-connected graphs which could defeat a k-active adversary (whose computation power is polynomially bounded) for k = cn, where c > 1 is any given constant. This result improves a great deal on the results of Franklin and Wright, and Wang and Desmedt.
Introduction
For example, Dolev 4] and Dolev, Dwork, Waarts, and Yung 5] showed that, in the case of k Byzantine faults, reliable communication is achievable only if the system's network is 2k + 1 connected. Hadzilacos 10] has shown that even in the absence of malicious failures connectivity k+1 is required to achieve reliable communication in the presence of k faulty participants.
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial 9], Franklin and Yung 7] , and Franklin and Wright 6] have initiated the study of secure communication and secure computation in multi-recipient (broadcast) models. A \broadcast channel" (such as Ethernet) enables one participant to send the same message|simultaneously and privately|to a xed subset of participants. Franklin and Yung 7] have given a necessary and su cient condition for individuals to exchange private messages in broadcast models in the presence of passive adversaries (passive gossipers). For the case of active Byzantine adversaries, many results have been presented by Franklin and Wright 6] . Note that Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial 9] have also studied the fault-tolerant computation in the public broadcast model in the presence of active Byzantine adversaries.
There are many examples of broadcast channels. A simple example is a local area network like an Ethernet bus or a token ring. Another example is a shared cryptographic key. By publishing an encrypted message, a participant initiates a broadcast to the subset of participants that is able to decrypt it.
We will abstract away the concrete network structures and consider multicast graphs. Speci cally, a multicast graph is just a graph G(V; E). A vertex A 2 V is called a neighbor of another vertex B 2 V if there is an edge (A; B) 2 E. In a multicast graph, we assume that any message sent by a node A will be received identically by all its neighbors, whether or not A is faulty, and all parties outside of A's neighbor learn nothing about the content of the message. The neighbor networks have been studied by Franklin and Yung in 7] . They have also studied the more general notion of hypergraphs, which we do not need. As Franklin and Wright 6] have pointed out, unlike the simple channel model, it is not possible to directly apply protocols over multicast lines to disjoint paths in a general multicast graph, since disjoint paths may have common neighbors. Franklin and Wright have shown that in certain cases the change from simple channel to broadcast channel hurts the adversary more than it helps, because the adversary su ers from the restriction that an incorrect transmission from a faulty processor will always be received identically by all of its neighbors.
It was shown 6] that if the sender and the receiver are strongly n-connected (that is, there are n paths with disjoint neighborhoods) and the malicious adversary can destroy at most k processors, then the condition n > k is necessary and su cient for achieving e cient probabilisticly reliable and probabilisticly private communication. They also showed that there is an e cient protocol to achieve probabilisticly reliable and perfectly private communication when n > d3k=2e.
Recently, Wang and Desmedt 13] have shown that, indeed, the condition n > k is necessary and su cient for achieving e cient probabilisticly reliable and perfectly private communication in broadcast channels.
De nition 1. Let A and B be two vertices on a multicast graph G(V; E). We say that A and B are strongly n-connected if there are n neighborhood disjoint paths p 1 ; : : :; p n between A and B, that is, for any i 6 = j( n), p i and p j have no common neighbor (except A and B). In other words, for any vertex v 2 V n fA; Bg, if there is a vertex u 1 on p i such that (v; u 1 ) 2 E, then there is no u 2 on p j such that (v; u 2 ) 2 E.
However, all these results are concerned with malicious adversaries with unlimited computational power. In this paper, we will consider the situation when the adversary's computational power is polynomial time bounded. Speci cally, assuming certain approximation hardness result, we will construct strongly nconnected multicast graphs which could defeat a k-active adversary (whose computation power is polynomial time bounded) for k = cn, where c > 1 is any given constant. This result improves a great deal on the results of Franklin and Wright 6] (which are for unconditional reliability). To achieve this improvement we use some of the hardness results of Burmester, Desmedt, and Wang in 3].
The idea underlying our construction is that we will design strongly nconnected communication graphs in such a way that it is hard for the adversary to nd the neighborhood disjoint n paths which is a witness to the strong nconnectivity. Hence the adversary does not know which processors to block (or control).
There have been many results (see, e.g., 1,12] for a survey) for hardness of approximating an NP-hard optimization problem within a factor c from \be-low". For example, it is hard to compute an independent set 1 V 0 of a graph G(V; E) with the property that jV 0 j n c for some given factor c, where n is the size of the maximum independent set of G. But for our problem, we are more concerned with approximating an NP-hard optimization problem from \above".
For example, given a graph G(V; E), how hard is it to compute a vertex set V 0 of G with jV 0 j cn such that V 0 contains an optimal independent set of G, where n is the size of the optimal independent set of G? Burmester, Desmedt, and Wang have shown that this kind of approximation problem is also NP-hard.
We will use this result to design strongly n-connected multicast graphs which is secure against an active adversary who can control cn vertices where c > 1 is some constant. The organization of this paper is as follows. We rst present in Section 2 some graph theoretic result which we will need in this paper. Section 3 surveys the model for commutation in broadcast channels. In Section 4 we demonstrate how to use strongly n-connected graphs with trapdoors to achieve reliable and private communication against active adversaries. In Section 5 we outline an approach to build strongly n-connected graphs with trapdoors. We conclude in Section 6 with remarks towards theoretical improvements and we present some open problems. 
Optimization and approximation
In this section we survey some graph theoretic results which will be used in later sections.
De nition 2. Given a graph G(V; E), a vertex subset V 0 V is called neighborhood independent if for any u; v 2 V 0 there is no w 2 V such that both (u; w) and (v; w) are edges in E. Theorem 1. Given a graph G(V; E) and a number n, it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a neighborhood independent set V 1 V of size n.
Proof. It is clear that the speci ed problem is in NP. Whence it su ces to reduce the following NP-complete problem IS (Independent Set) to our problem. The independent set problem is: Instance: A graph G(V; E) and a number t. Question: Does there exist a node set V 1 V of size n such that any two nodes in V 1 are not connected by an edge in E?
The input GI(V G ; E G ), to IS, consists of a set of vertices V G = fv 1 ; : : :; v m g and a set of edges E G . In the following we construct a graph f(GI) = G(V; E) such that there is an independent set of size n in GI if and only if there is a neighborhood independent set of size n in G. 
Theorem 2. ( 3])
There is a constant " > 0 such that it is NP-hard to compute a vertex set V 0 V of a graph G(V; E), with the following properties:
1. jV 0 j nm " , where n is the size of the maximum neighborhood independent set of G and m = jV j. 2. V 0 contains a neighborhood independent vertex set V 00 such that jV 00 j n 2 . Corollary 1. ( 3] ) There is a constant " > 0 such that it is NP-hard to compute a vertex set V 0 V of a graph G(V; E), with the following properties:
1. jV 0 j nm " , where n is the size of the maximum neighborhood independent set of G and m = jV j. 2. V 0 contains a neighborhood independent vertex set V 00 such that jV 00 j n.
Models
Following Franklin and Wright 6], we consider multicast as our only communication primitive. A message that is multicast by any node in a multicast neighbor network is received by all its neighbors with privacy (that is, non-neighbors learn nothing about what was sent) and authentication (that is, neighbors are guaranteed to receive the value that was multicast and to know which neighbor multicast it). In our models, we assume that all nodes in the multicast graph know the complete protocol speci cation and the complete structure of the multicast graph. In a message transmission protocol, the sender A starts with a message M A drawn from a message space M with respect to a certain probability distribution. At the end of the protocol, the receiver B outputs a message M B . We consider a synchronous system in which messages are sent via multicast in rounds. During each round of the protocol, each node receives any messages that were multicast by its neighbors at the end of the previous round, ips coins and perform local computations, and then possibly multicast a message.
Generally there are two kinds of adversaries. A passive adversary (or gossiper adversary) is an adversary who can only observe the tra cs through k internal nodes. An active adversary (or Byzantine adversary) is an adversary with polynomial-time bounded computational power who can control k internal nodes. That is, an active adversary will not only listen to the tra cs through the controlled nodes, but also control the message sent by those controlled nodes. Both kinds of adversaries are assumed to know the complete protocol specication, message space, and the complete structure of the multicast graph. At the start of the protocol, the adversary chooses the k faulty nodes. A passive adversary can view the behavior (coin ips, computations, message received) of all the faulty nodes. An active adversary can view all the behavior of the faulty nodes and, in addition, control the message that they multicast. We allow for the strongest adversary. Throughout this paper, unless speci ed otherwise, we will use k to denote the number of nodes that the adversary can control and use n to denote the connectivity of the network.
For any execution of the protocol, let adv be the adversary's view of the entire protocol. We write adv(M; r) to denote the adversary's view when M A = M and when the sequence of coin ips used by the adversary is r. The probabilities are taken over the coin ips of the honest parties, and the sum is over all possible values of the adversary's view.
3. A message transmission protocol is perfectly private if it is 0-private. 4 . A message transmission protocol is ("; )-secure if it is "-private andreliable.
5. An ("; )-secure message transmission protocol is e cient if its round complexity and bit complexity are polynomial in the size of the network, log 1 " (if " > 0) and log 1 (if > 0). In order for an adversary to attack the broadcast communication system which is modeled by a strongly n-connected graph, s/he does not need to nd all of the n neighborhood disjoint paths (p 1 ; : : :; p n ) in the graph. S/he can choose to control one neighbor vertex on each of the n paths.
De nition 4. Let G be a strongly n-connected graph, and P = fp 1 ; : : :; p n g be a witness to the strong n-connectivity of the graph. A set S = fv 1 ; : : :; v k g of vertices in G is called an eavesdropping vertex set of P if for each path p i 2 P (i = 1; : : :; n), there is a v j 2 S which is a neighbor of p i .
Note that in the above de nition, k could be larger than or smaller than n.
Remark: The problem of nding an eavesdropping vertex set in a strongly k-connected graph is NP-hard which will be proved in Section 5.
The following theorem follows straightforwardly from the corresponding theorems in Franklin 
Reliable and private communication with trapdoors
In this section, we show how to design reliable and private communication systems with trapdoors such that the following condition is satis ed: { The broadcast communication system modeled by a strongly n-connected graph is robust against a polynomial time bounded k-active adversary where k cn and c > 1 is any given constant.
The idea is to use the fact that it is NP-hard to nd an eavesdropping vertex set of a strongly n-connected graph. It follows that if one designs the graph in such a way that the trusted participants can easily nd a witness to the strong n-connectivity of the graph, and the sender and receiver always initiate a communication through this witness, then reliable and private communication is possible. The bene t from using trapdoors in a communication system with broadcast channels is obvious. If we do not use trapdoors then, Franklin and Wright 6]'s results show that a strongly n-connected graph is only robust against k-active adversaries when k < n. However, if we use trapdoors in the design of graphs, then with high probability, a strongly n-connected graph is robust against k-active adversaries where k cn and c > 1 is any given constant. The reason is that even though the adversary has the power to jam or control k > n vertices in the graph, he does not know which vertices to corrupt such that each path p i will have a corrupted neighbor (which can eavesdrop on the messages sent through the path p i ).
De nition 5. Let fG n g n2N be an ensemble on graphs with the property that each graph in G n is strongly n-connected, where N is the set of positive integers, and let k n (n = 1; 2; : : :) be The probabilities in the above de nition are taken over the corresponding random variables G n and the internal coin tosses of the algorithm D.
Indeed, for the k n and n in De nition 5, if k n < n, then every ensemble fG n g n2N is polynomial-time robust against k n -active adversaries. So one of the main problems is to design graph ensembles fG n g n2N which are polynomial-time robust against k n -active adversaries for k n n, that is, to design strongly nconnected graphs in which it is hard on the average case to nd an eavesdropping vertex set of size k n. In Section 5, we will outline an approach to generate such kind of graphs. In the remaining part of this section we will demonstrate how to use these graphs to achieve reliability and privacy in broadcast channels.
Protocol I
1. Alice generates a strongly n-connected graph G such that nding a size k(= cn) eavesdropping vertex set is hard, where c > 1 is any given constant.
(The details will be presented in Section 5). 2. Using a secure channel, Alice sends to the sender and the receiver the n neighborhood disjoint paths P = fp 1 ; : : :; p n g which is a witness to the strong n-connectivity of G. 3. In order to carry out one communication, the sender and the receiver initiate the communication protocol in Theorem 3 through the n paths in P. Note that our above protocol is not proactive, that is, it is not secure against a dynamic adversary who after observing one communication will change the vertices he controls. Indeed, it is an interesting open problem to design protocols which are secure against dynamic adversaries.
First assume that Mallory is a k-active adversary where k = cn for some constant c > 1, and P = fp 1 ; : : :; p n g is the set of neighborhood disjoint paths used in Protocol I. Since Mallory does not know how to nd a size k eavesdropping vertex set for P ( nding such a set is very hard, e.g., as hard as factoring a 1024-bit integer), she does not know which vertices to corrupt so that she can corrupt the system even though she has the power to corrupt k = cn vertices. It follows that the system is robust against a k-active adversary.
5 Strongly n-connected graphs with trapdoors
In this section, we consider the problem of designing strongly n-connected graphs with trapdoors. By using Corollary 1, we will construct practical average-case hard strongly n-connected graphs which are robust against k-active adversaries for k = n+c, where c is some given constant. Our following construction is based on the hardness of factoring a large integer and we will not use the approximation hardness results (which will be used to prove theoretical results in the next section).
Construction Let N be a large number which is a product of two primes p and q. We will construct a strongly n-connected graph G with the following property: given the number N and an eavesdropping vertex set for G, one can compute e ciently the two factors p and q. Let x 1 ; : : :; x t and y 1 ; : : :; y t be variables which take values 0 and 1, where t = blog Nc. And let (x t : : :x 1 ) 2 and (y t : : :y 1 ) 2 to denote the binary representations of P x i 2 i?1 and P y i 2 i?1 respectively. Then use the relation (x t : : :x 1 ) 2 (y t : : :y 1 ) 2 = N (1) to construct a 3SAT formula C with the following properties:
1. C has at most O(t 2 ) clauses. 2. C is satis able and, from a satisfying assignment of C, one can compute in linear time an assignment of x 1 ; : : :; x t ; y 1 ; : : :; y t such that the equation (1) is satis ed. That is, from a satisfying assignment of C, one can factor N easily. Now use the construction in Theorem 1 to construct a graph G 0 (V 0 ; E 0 ) and a number n = O(t 2 ) with the property that: from a size n neighborhood independent set of G 0 , one can compute in linear time a satisfying assignment of C. Lastly, the following procedure will generate a strongly n-connected graph G with the property that, from a size n + c eavesdropping vertex set of G, one can compute in linear time a size n neighborhood independent set of G 0 . Whence from any size n + c eavesdropping vertex set of G, one can computes in polynomial time the primes p and q. As a summary, our construction proceeds as follows. . Hence there is a neighborhood independent set of size n in G 0 if and only if A and B are strongly n-connected in G. And from n neighborhood disjoint paths in G one can compute in linear time a size n neighborhood independent set in G 0 . Whence it is su cient to show that from each size n + c eavesdropping vertex set S 0 of G, one can compute in polynomial time a size n neighborhood independent set of G 0 .
Since S 0 is an eavesdropping vertex set of G and G is strongly n-connected, there is at least one size n subset S of S 0 such that { S itself is an eavesdropping vertex set of G; { S is a neighborhood independent set of G 0 .
There are ? n+c n = ? n+c c (which is a polynomial in n) many di erent size n subsets of S 0 . Whence by considering all these di erent size n subset of S 0 we can compute in polynomial time a size n vertex set S with the above properties.
It is straightforward to see that the above constructed strongly n-connected graph G is robust against k-active adversaries for k = n + c if factoring N is hard, where c is any given constant.
In order to state our main theorem, we need the following assumption of average hardness of factoring.
Hardness Assumption of Factoring: There exists an ensemble fX n g n2N (where X n is a subset of composite numbers of length n) such that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D from positive integers to positive integers, every polynomial p( ), and all su ciently large n, the following condition is satis ed:
Now it is clear that our above discussion implies the following result:
Theorem 4. Assume the average hardness of factoring, then we can construct a graph ensemble fG n g n2N which is polynomial-time robust against k n -active adversaries, where k n = n + c for some constant c > 1. Proof. It follows from the preceding discussions.
u t
Towards theoretical improvements
In the previous section, we outlined a \practical" approach for constructing strongly n-connected graphs which are robust against k-active adversaries for k = n + c. In this section we consider theoretical improvements. That is, we will construct strongly n-connected graphs which are robust against k-active adversaries for k = cn.
Construction First generate a graph G 0 (V 0 ; E 0 ) and a number n which satisfy the conditions of Corollary 1. Secondly, using the method from the previous section of constructing the strongly n-connected graph G(V; E) from G 0 (V 0 ; E 0 ), we construct the strongly n-connected graph G(V; E) with the following properties:
1. Two paths P 1 and P 2 in G which go through u i and u j respectively are neighborhood disjoint if and only if u i and u j have no common neighbor in G 0 (see the previous section for details). 2. There is a size n neighborhood independent set in G 0 if and only if there are n neighborhood disjoint paths in G. And from n neighborhood disjoint paths in G one can compute in linear time a size n neighborhood independent set in G 0 .
From the construction of G from G 0 , it is straightforward that for any size cn eavesdropping vertex set S 0 of G, S 0 contains a size n neighborhood independent set of G 0 .
By Corollary 1, the graph G is robust against cn-active adversaries.
u t Remark: The above construction shows that, with some reasonable assumption (for example, assume the existence of a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to generate hard strongly n-connected graphs needed in the above construction, it is possible to construct an ensemble fG n g n2N of strongly nconnected graphs which is robust against polynomial-time k n -active adversaries, where k n = cn for some constant c > 1.
In this section, we constructed strongly n-connected graphs which are robust against cn-active adversaries. However, these constructions are ine cient and are only of theoretical interests, since the size of the graph G in Corollary 1 will be enormous if we want to make the security of the system to be at least as hard as an exhaustive search of a 1024-bit space. One of the most interesting open questions is how to e ciently generate hard instances of strongly n-connected graphs, especially, for arbitrary number n.
We should also note that, in order to construct the strongly n-connected graphs in this section, we need to construct standard graphs which satisfy the conditions of Corollary 1. That is, we need an algorithm to build graphs whose neighborhood independent sets are hard to approximate in the average case. Whence it is interesting (and open) to prove some average-case hardness results for the corresponding problems.
Our protocols in this paper are not proactive, that is, not robust against a dynamic adversary who after observing one communication will change the vertices he controls. It is an interesting open problem to design protocols which are secure against dynamic adversaries.
